@proceedings {6711,
	title = {Formal Specification and Verification of 5G Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol using mCRL2},
	journal = {International Conference on Networking and Advanced Systems (ICNAS)},
	year = {2021},
	address = {Annaba, Algeria},
	abstract = {
	The fifth-generation (5G) standard is the last telecommunication technology, widely considered to have the most important characteristics in the future network industry. The 5G system infrastructure contains three principle interfaces, each one follows a set of protocols defined by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project group (3GPP). For the next generation network, 3GPP specified two authentication methods systematized in two protocols namely 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). Such protocols are provided to ensure the authentication between system entities. These two protocols are critical systems, thus their reliability and correctness must be guaranteed. In this paper, we aim to formally re-examine 5G-AKA protocol using micro Common Representation Language 2 (mCRL2) language to verify such a security protocol. The mCRL2 language and its associated toolset are formal tools used for modeling, validation, and verification of concurrent systems and protocols. In this context, the authentication protocol 5G-AKA model is built using Algebra of Communication Processes (ACP), its properties are specified using Modal mu-Calculus and the properties analysis exploits Model-Checker provided with mCRL2. Indeed, we propose a new mCRL2 model of 3GPP specification considering 5G-AKA protocol and we specify some properties that describe necessary requirements to evaluate the correctness of the protocol where the parsed properties of Deadlock Freedom, Reachability, Liveness and Safety are positively assessed.

},
	url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9628917},
	author = {Hafidi, Hossem Eddine and Hmidi, Zohra and Kahloul, Laid and Benharzallah, Saber}
}
